Hollywood Profit Participation Deals Are a Work in Progress

By Elizabeth Kirillova

When Marilyn Monroe, Alfred Hitchcock and other Hollywood icons graced the red carpet in the 1950s, contractual perks like profit participation deals were luxuries few actors and directors had the ability to demand. It was not until after World War II, when the proliferation of home television sets prompted the dissolution of monopolistic film studios, that the industry witnessed the arrival of modern-day profit participation. Still, the evolution of compensation agreements has yet to reach its end. In fact, as the world continues to recover from the COVID-19 global pandemic, the industry is venturing into a new phase of profit participation. Today, streaming giants, such as Netflix and Disney Plus, have not only changed the landscape of film distribution but have also impacted how actors and directors are compensated.  

When Film Studios Learned that Sharing Is Caring

Until the 1950s, the studio system ruled the entertainment industry. Actors, directors and writers (oh my!) were at the mercy of eight major studios and subject to long-term, exclusive contracts. Studios paid contracted personnel a fixed weekly or per-picture salary, which could be egregiously disproportionate to the true value the individual brought to the project.[1] Famously, Marilyn Monroe received just $1,500 per week for her role in Gentlemen Prefer Blondes under her contract with 20th Century Fox.[2] Only a handful of directors and producers had enough leverage to negotiate a profit participation agreement, otherwise known as a “backend deal.” Under this type of deal structure, the director or producer receives additional compensation for their film, calculated as a percentage of the profits left over after the studio recoups production expenses and distribution fees.

 But by 1950, the power of the studio system had drastically decayed as television entered the scene, granting some A-list actors the influence required to negotiate more favorable contracts. In 1950, prominent film actor James Stewart was the first to broker a profit participation deal with Universal Pictures.[3] Prior to this deal, Stewart typically earned $200,000 in up-front compensation before he began shooting, which was beyond the financial capacity of Universal.[4] Instead of seeking an up-front arrangement, Stewart negotiated to receive fifty percent of the film’s net profits. As an early form of backend compensation, net profits under a net profit participation deal were calculated by tallying gross receipts (a film’s total revenue) less the studio’s distribution and advertising expenses, studio overhead, and interest.[5] If the film did not break even, Stewart would not be compensated for his role.[6] This risk-shifting agreement enabled Universal to reduce the immediate cost of production and required Stewart to share some of the production risk. In the end, Stewart walked away with $600,000 for his work on the film—three times his usual salary—which is equivalent to roughly $6.5 million dollars in 2021.[7]

Always Read the Terms and Conditions!

As net profit agreements became more popular, some studios were not satisfied with their share of the pie. As a result, studios applied their creativity to their finances through a practice aptly called “Hollywood accounting.” This term describes the process by which studios inflate a film’s expenditures, including the cost of distribution fees, in order to reduce net profits.[8] By doing so, studios get away with distributing less in profit-sharing payouts and reducing the amount owed in taxes and royalties.[9]  

Attorneys play a pivotal role in Hollywood accounting because these accounting practices rely heavily on contract interpretation. These contracts are usually negotiated between studio attorneys and talent representatives.[10] As such, a studio’s lawyers are responsible for understanding how to financially structure these deals.[11] However, many terms commonly used in backend agreements have no industry consensus as to their precise meaning.[12] Despite this lack of clarity, contracts frequently define terms according to their generally understood meaning in the motion picture industry, creating ambiguities that can be used to the studio’s advantage.[13] Perhaps studios intentionally insert such ambiguities to exploit an unknown future financial situation, or maybe the parties merely could not come to a consensus on the definition.[14] Regardless, contractual uncertainty invites litigation, as interpretation of such industry terms can differ widely.

One such instance of Hollywood accounting was litigated in Buchwald v. Paramount Pictures, Corp., a formative copyright infringement and breach of contract case between Paramount Pictures and the writer of a successful film, Coming to America. In Buchwald, the writer asserted that Paramount had unconscionably warped the definition of net profits in the writer’s option contract in order to deprive him of backend compensation.[15] Although the film earned $288 million in ticket sales, Paramount testified that it had invested so much in production and marketing that it had not made a net profit according to the formula outlined in the writer’s contract.[16] The court encouraged the writer to pursue a separate tort lawsuit against Paramount to recoup damages for the unconscionability of his option contract, but the parties eventually settled for $900,000 for unrelated copyright infringement claims.[17]  

As Hollywood continues to practice creative accounting, profit participants are entitled to assert their audit rights and “challenge inequities in the definitions” of their contracts.[18] Because Hollywood accounting is so routine, participation audits are not seen as a sign of distrust, but rather as an opportunity to confirm the veracity of accountings and to raise any interpretation issues that are not made clear within the relevant contract.[19] In fact, this practice is a “time-honored tradition in the motion picture business,” which demonstrates the extent to which Hollywood accounting is ingrained in the industry.[20]

Gross Participation as the Gold Standard of Deal Structures

 In the 1970s, independent production companies made a splash in the Hollywood scene by offering generous compensation packages to actors and directors.[KM1] [21] In response to the added competition, major studios entered into gross profit participation agreements with actors and directors, under which the actors and directors received upfront compensation as well as a share of the profits before the studio deducted a distribution fee.[22] [KM2] By contrast, net profit deals grant actors and directors any residual money left after all allowable deductions are made.[23]

 Since the 2000s, these gross profit structures have evolved, allowing actors and directors to receive post-breakeven profits after the studio recovers a portion of the more accurately calculated production and distribution expenses. Once these costs have been recovered, the talent receives their share of the gross profits based on the amount negotiated in their work-for-hire employment contract.[24]

 Overall, traditional gross participation has become less mainstream, as studios wish to reduce their risk exposure and avoid distributing profits on films that may lose money. Consequently, studios typically reserve gross profit participation agreements for reputable talent with sufficient clout, knowing that such celebrities will attract greater audiences and fill more seats in movie theaters—thus increasing revenues and minimizing risk.[25] Conversely, actors and directors whose names carry little weight may be offered less lucrative net profit deals.[26]  

Since the turn of the century, profit participation for television shows has become increasingly popular for long-running television series. Traditionally, for a show to be profitable, the series would have needed to be in production for several years. For most shows, this meant reaching eighty to one hundred episodes or surpassing several seasons.[27]  

 Although the industry has had over 70 years to experiment with backend compensation agreements, a uniform practice has yet to be adopted. Indeed, a uniform profit participation method will likely never take a leading role on the Hollywood stage because compensation agreements will likely continue to diversify as Hollywood further explores new avenues of distribution.

Enter Streaming Giants Center Stage

From Netflix to HBO Max, many people would run out of fingers counting their subscriptions to various streaming platforms. Like home television sets, which constituted a technological turning point in the 1950s, streaming platforms have revolutionized film and television distribution today by drastically altering the way in which the public consumes such content. In 2010, Netflix went from being the “fastest-growing first-class mail customer” of the U.S. Postal Service to the “biggest source of streaming Web traffic in North America during peak evening hours.”[28] By 2020, Netflix’s revenue was a whopping $25 billion.[29]

Other platforms, such as Amazon Prime Video, HBO Max, and Disney Plus, are in hot pursuit of Netflix’s staggering success. The streaming wars have triggered intense competition among these services, as pressure to accrue greater audience membership and the race to produce high quality films and television shows has pushed these platforms to distribute content internationally.[30] As the public increasingly relies on content being accessible to them from the comfort of their couch, backend deal paradigms continue to evolve. Presently, streaming platforms are encouraging an industrywide change to deal structures that goes beyond traditional backend compensation.

Before launching Disney Plus in 2019, Disney instituted a new profit participation system.[31] Although Netflix and Amazon were already pushing for a similar model, Disney was the first to apply such a system to all new television shows on its platform.[32] Acknowledging these industry changes, Ted Harbet, a former executive for ABC and NBC, affirmed that a “precedent [had] been set by the new lions in town.”[33]

Known as the “per-point” model, Disney’s practice involves paying talent and producers a fixed monetary amount, measured in “points,” rather than paying a percentage of a show’s profits.[34] Points are awarded to shows based on objective factors, such as a series’ ratings, duration and overall success. [35] For each point a series earns, talent and producers receive a corresponding amount of money. The monetary value of each point is uniform across Disney’s portfolio of shows.[36] In exchange, the studio maintains “the right to exploit the show on any platform without having to make a separate deal for profit participants.”[37] The per-point system enables the studio to license a show wherever and whenever it wants without having to check in with profit participants.[38] This model also intends to simplify the way profit participation fees are doled out by expediting payments to profit participants.[39] 

Since points are assigned to a show based on empirical and uniform factors, this system may help circumvent profit disputes, like the infamous five-year battle between 20th Century Fox and popular crime show, Bones. In the dispute, Fox was accused of charging licensing fees below market rates to its own distribution affiliates, such as Hulu. The stars of the hit show contended that they were deprived of backend compensation due to these low licensing fees; they have since negotiated a sizeable settlement with Fox.[40] 

There is a strong possibility that other major studios will follow Disney’s lead and adopt a per-point model. Setting this trend would not come as a surprise, considering Disney’s heavyweight role in the industry as the owner of 21st Century Fox, Pixar, and Marvel.[41] In fact, Amazon Prime Video already follows a similar model, through which the studio awards backend compensation based on an assigned value that increases as subsequent seasons of a show are produced.[42]

Netflix, on the other hand, compensates its creators for the cost of production and supplements this cost with a negotiated profit payment beginning with the first episode.[43] Effectively, Netflix buys out a show’s “backend at the outset, in exchange for paying a full license fee plus a premium.”[44] Like the Disney model, content creators and actors are rewarded with bonuses after successful new seasons.[45]

Despite the benefits of these systems, agents and lawyers have raised pertinent questions regarding the fairness and potential shortfalls of these new deal structures. For one, the per-point model risks divesting creators from substantial income for hit television shows. Leigh Brecheen, a celebrated entertainment attorney, warned that the per-point system prevents creators from seeing “any additional money” despite a studio potentially running a show “10,000 times on their streaming services and ... 10,000 times on their own network” while also selling “tons of advertising” and “tons of subscriptions.”[46]

Additionally, considering that a show obtains a point value that is allocated on its initial run, it is unclear whether other procedures will be implemented to rectify a show’s undervaluation if the show receives delayed success in the years after it debuts.[47] Netflix’s revival of the NBC show Manifest in the summer of 2020 exemplifies how a series can obtain such delayed popularity. Because Manifest suffered from a mediocre initial run on NBC, Netflix’s per-point system likely undervalued the worth of the show. Only once Netflix began streaming the series online did Manifest become a household name—a testament to Netflix’s sway on pop culture.

Another factor complicates the future of the per-point system. Some members of SAG-AFTRA are entitled to receive backend compensation as part of their negotiated union contracts, which may be incompatible with the streaming services’ practices.[48] [KM3] David White, the executive director at SAG-AFTRA, expressed concerns about “any attempt to cap or shortchange backend payments for talent” and stated that the Guild is “monitoring these changes very closely.”[49] All of these concerns about the way compensation schemes play out have been further exacerbated by the chaos and uncertainty unleashed by the COVID-19 pandemic.  

No Time for COVID-19

COVID-19 has proven to be one of Hollywood’s most diabolical and complex villains. To contain the outbreak of this frightening virus, the US went into a state of national emergency in early March 2020. Movie theaters were shut down, film festivals were cancelled, and release dates were postponed indefinitely.

Unsurprisingly, studios were quick to seek novel avenues for growing revenue, taking advantage of the newfound surplus of consumer’s free time. In addition to maintaining subscription-based streaming platforms, studios debuted Premium Video on Demand (PVoD). An alternative to theatrical releases, PVoD allows subscribers to watch a newly released film at home for an additional fee on top of their regular subscription.

Early in the pandemic, surveys found that 22 percent of consumers paid to watch a new release through PVoD.[54] Take, for instance, Frozen II, which was originally set for theater release on June 26, 2020 but instead premiered on Disney Plus on March 15, 2020. Frozen II has since become the “highest grossing animated movie in history.”[55] Discussing the decision to make Frozen II available on Disney Plus, Disney CEO Bob Chapek stated that “the powerful themes of perseverance and the importance of family ... are incredibly relevant during this time.”[56]  Similarly, Universal Pictures released The Invisible Man on Amazon Prime Video at an additional cost for Amazon Prime members, grossing $124 million worldwide.[57] The success of these films demonstrates that subscribers were willing to pay an additional fee as the demand for fresh content persisted. In fact, it is possible that the stress and boredom which accompanied stay-at-home orders increased demand for such content.

Alternatively, some studios resorted to postponing a film’s theatrical release. The James Bond film No Time to Die was originally scheduled for release in April 2020.[58] Famously, due to COVID-19, the film was first pushed to November 2020, delayed again to April 2021, and then postponed further based on concerns that the theatrical market had not yet adequately recovered.[59] At last, the public was able to see Daniel Craig’s final portrayal as the legendary James Bond when the film was finally released on October 8, 2021.  

Interestingly, once No Time to Die actually debuted, box office sales indicated a positive trend for the movie theater business. Over the first weekend, No Time to Die garnered $56 million in domestic box office sales, which met MGM’s expectations of a $55 to $60 million opening weekend.[60] Notably, as one of Hollywood’s most popular franchises, James Bond already possesses a cult following among adult viewers, akin to the Frozen II mania for children. Standalone films that are neither part of a franchise nor constitute a sequel are less likely to dominate box office sales while movie theaters continue to recover from the pandemic.

Postponing a release date is arguably an optimistic alternative, as this practice hinges on the belief that pandemic-driven conditions will improve or cease entirely. Unfortunately, this approach is also perhaps the least sustainable, as the COVID-19 situation continues to fluctuate. Indefinitely delaying the release of a film can not only undermine the efforts of marketers and distributors but may also disappoint ambitious creators, talent, and eager viewers.  

Suing the Happiest Place on Earth

As profit participation continues to evolve, and a global pandemic generates further uncertainty in film distribution, what remains is an elephant-sized gray area: how will all these changes come together in practice? Although a definite answer to this question does not yet exist, Hollywood attorneys have been the first to bring these issues to the courtroom.

Chapek, Disney’s CEO, explained that Disney’s distribution of Black Widow “was driven by its belief that the theatrical market wouldn’t be fully recovered by the time of the movie’s release.”[68] However, Johansson’s complaint alleged that “Disney intentionally induced Marvel’s breach of the agreement, without justification, in order to prevent Ms. Johansson from realizing the full benefit of her bargain with Marvel.”[69]

 The complaint stressed the financial significance of traditional theatrical releases because the greater the worldwide box office receipts, “the more Ms. Johansson [stood] to earn” from her share of the profits.[70] With access to Disney Plus, Disney forwent repeat-ticket sales from moviegoers who would have seen the film more than once. Moreover, Disney Plus subscribers interested in seeing the film only had to wait 90 days to access the film through their regular eight-dollar monthly subscriptions instead of relying on Premier Access.[71] Johansson’s complaint suggested that Disney should have waited for the market to recover before releasing the film. However, the original release date of Black Widow was scheduled for May 2020.[72] By the time the film was actually released, over a year had passed and the Marvel cinematic universe had moved on to the next stage of development.[73]

Further, Johansson alleged that she fulfilled her end of the bargain by promoting Black Widow and “therefore, by association, its release on [Disney Plus].”[74] As a result, Johansson advertised Disney’s “wholly owned subscription service at no additional cost to Disney.”[75] The complaint called attention to the fact that two Disney executives, Chairman Robert Iger and CEO Bob Chapek, received bonuses in the form of stock and equity grants due to the successful performance of Disney Plus.[76] The complaint alleged that these bonuses induced Disney to breach its contract with Johansson under the rationale that executives should “increase [Disney Plus] subscribers, never mind [their] contractual promises, and [they would] be rewarded.”[77] The generous bonuses paid to these executives seem to imply that the future of film and television lies in the success of streaming services, and savvy talent must change their contract negotiations to share in that success.  

The Black Widow dispute, while unprecedented, is a harbinger of the type of litigation that is likely to arise out of Hollywood’s use of vague accounting terms. Johansson’s contract, which she signed in 2017, stated that, though the producer had the sole discretion whether to release the film, any such release must be a “wide theatrical release.”[78] Johansson’s complaint alleged that the parties understood that the agreement referred to an exclusive release in theaters in accordance with “custom and practice in the film industry for feature films to have at least a 90-day exclusive theatrical release.”[79] 

Notably, the contract did not explicitly refer to an exclusive theatrical release. Indeed, Disney tested this provision by interpreting the term “theatrical release” to also include PVoD. From a purely legal standpoint, Disney may have had a compelling argument to warrant release of the film via PVoD given the disruption that COVID-19 caused to film distribution. As such, had the dispute not settled, Disney could have potentially raised a frustration of purpose defense under contract law and asserted that Disney’s contractual responsibilities were impeded by a global pandemic. Moving forward, this type of litigation may encourage Disney and other studios to carefully define the contractual provisions outlining a film’s intended channels of distribution. At the very least, actors and directors should check with their own attorneys prior to embarking on a new project to ensure that they do not fall into the same trap as Johansson.  

Circumventing Future Black Widow Disputes

 How might disputes like the Black Widow conflict be preemptively handled so that studios and talent can avoid such explosive lawsuits in the future? Like streaming services, studios could offer upfront payments for films slated for PVoD release by applying their own per-point system. Studios could further offer to assign points based on their valuation of a film’s overall success to compensate actors and directors for lost box office sales. A mechanism could also exist to adjust the number of points a film incurs once consumers and critics have access to view the film[EH5] .

 Additionally, actors and directors should attempt to negotiate their contracts so that they are entitled to receive advance notice informing them whether their films may be released directly to streaming platforms. This will enable all parties to fairly negotiate their contracts and ensure that film distribution conforms with the current industry climate. If all parties agree that the film may be released directly to PVoD, any talent involved in promoting the film could demand bonus compensation for the role they play in advertising the streaming platform.

If the World Is Standing Six Feet Apart, Are Movie Theaters Six Feet Under?

 The changes brought about or accelerated by the COVID-19 virus have Hollywood attorneys, talent, creators, and producers reaching for their crystal balls, wondering what will come next. Will streaming and PVoD distribution systems fundamentally change film distribution in the long-term? Is the industry ready to accept the idea that feature films, like television, might regularly premiere at home? Is it possible that Scarlett Johansson’s highly visible lawsuit will motivate studios to create compensation schemes that better manage profit participants’ expectations? Will studios refine contractual terms beyond generic definitions for the sake of circumventing litigation? When James Stewart negotiated the first profit-participation deal structure, he likely could not have predicted the long-lasting changes it would bring to Hollywood compensation packages. Hopefully, observers of entertainment law will not need to wait quite as long to learn the answers to these unknowns.

EndNotes

[1] See Mark Litwak, Dealmaking in the Film & Television Industry 15 (4th ed. 2016).

[2] Margaret Heidenry, How Hollywood Salaries Really Work, Vanity Fair (Feb. 1, 2018), https://www.vanityfair.com/hollywood/2018/02/hollywood-movie-salaries-wage-gap-equality.

[3] Bill Daniels et al., Movie Money: Understanding Hollywood’s (Creative) Accounting Practices 199 (3d ed. 2020).

[4] Id.

[5] Id. at 276.  

[6] Id. at 207.

[7] Shannon Allen, Winchester ’73, a New Jimmy Stewart, and Gloria, Vanguard of Hollywood (Jan. 1, 2021), https://vanguardofhollywood.com/winchester-73/.

[8] See Derek Thompson, How Hollywood Accounting Can Make a $450 Million Movie ‘Unprofitable’, The Atlantic (Sept. 14, 2011), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2011/09/how-hollywood-accounting-can-make-a-450-million-movie-unprofitable/245134/.

[9] Id.

[10]  UCLA, 44th Annual UCLA Entertainment Symposium Webinar Series (2020),  https://law.ucla.edu/sites/default/files/PDFs/Ziffren/Backend%20-%20Materials%20%26%20Bio.pdf.   

[11] Heidenry, supra note 2.

[12] UCLA, supra note 10.

[13] Id.

[14] Id.

[15] Litwak, supra note 1, at 354.

[16]J.C. Macek III, Hollywood Creative Accounting, Or, How to Hide A Hit and Still Profit From It, PopMatters (May 12, 2015), https://www.popmatters.com/192246-hollywood-creative-accounting-or-how-to-hide-a-hit-and-still-profit--2495541881.html.

[17] Id.

[18] Daniels et al., supra note 3, at 210.  

[19] Id. at 240.  

[20] Id. at 207.  

[21] Id. at 200.  

[22] Id.

[23] Litwak, supra note 1, at 536.

[24] Daniels et al., supra note 3, at 201.

[25] Id. at 274.

[26] Id.

[27]Ilan Haimoff, The Evolution of Profit Participations, Entertainment and Media Report 15 (2017), https://www.ghjadvisors.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/2017-Entertainment-and-Media-Whitepaper.pdf.

[28] Tim Arango & David Carr, Netflix’s Move onto the Web Stirs Rivalries, N.Y Times (Nov. 24, 2010), https://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/25/business/25netflix.html.

[29] Tom Ward, How Has the Unstoppable Rise of Streaming Platforms Impacted Film? We Asked the Experts, Esquire (June 9, 2021), https://www.esquire.com/uk/culture/tv/a36842312/streaming-platforms/.

[30] See Brad Adgate, The Streaming Wars Is About Global Distribution and Investing in Programming, Forbes (Aug. 24, 2021), https://www.forbes.com/sites/bradadgate/2021/08/24/to-compete-with-netflix-its-about-global-distribution-and-investing-in-content/?sh=32c712f8408b.

[31] Stephen Battaglio & Wendy Lee, The End of Backend? Disney Wants to Limit Profit Participation on Its New TV Shows, L.A. Times (Sept. 12, 2019), https://www.latimes.com/entertainment-arts/business/story/2019-09-12/disney-tv-shows-backend-profit-participation-changes.

[32] Id.  

[33] Id.  

[34] Nellie Andreeva, Disney TV Studios Eyes New Profit Participation Model as Industry Continues to Pull Away from Traditional Backend Deals, Deadline (July 8, 2019), https://deadline.com/2019/07/hollywood-profit-participation-tv-deals-changes-disney-streaming-services-1202641423/.

[35] Id.  

[36] Id.  

[37] Id.  

[38] Battaglio & Lee, supra note 31.

[39] See id.  

[40] Eriq Gardner, Fox Settles ‘Bones’ Suit, Ending Profits Case That Stunned Hollywood, Hollywood Reporter (Sept. 11, 2019), https://www.hollywoodreporter.com/business/business-news/fox-settles-bones-suit-ending-profits-case-stunned-hollywood-1238843/.

[41] Battaglio & Lee, supra note 31.

[42] Id.

[43] Id.  

[44] Andreeva, supra note 34.

[45] Id.  

[46] Battaglio & Lee, supra note 31.

[47] See Andreeva, supra note 34.

[48] See Daniels et al., supra note 3, at 164.

[49] Battaglio & Lee, supra note 31.

[50] Brad Adgate, The Impact COVID-19 Had on the Entertainment Industry In 2020, Forbes (Apr. 13, 2021), https://www.forbes.com/sites/bradadgate/2021/04/13/the-impact-covid-19-had-on-the-entertainment-industry-in-2020/?sh=28a08552250f.

[51] Id.

[52] Id.

[53] Motion Picture Association of America, THEME Report 12 (2020), https://www.motionpictures.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/MPA-2020-THEME-Report.pdf.

[54] Shashank Srivastava, After COVID-19, Will Movie Fans Return to the Theater — or Keep Watching at Home?, Deloitte (July 31, 2020), https://www2.deloitte.com/us/en/insights/industry/technology/pvod-upend-content-covid.html.

[55] Rebecca Rubin, ‘Frozen 2’ Is Now the Highest-Grossing Animated Movie Ever, Variety (Jan. 5, 2020), https://variety.com/2020/film/box-office/frozen-2-biggest-animated-movie-ever-disney-box-office-1203456758/.

[56] Trilby Beresford, ‘Frozen 2’ to Debut on Disney+ Months Earlier Than Planned,  Hollywood Reporter (Mar. 13, 2020),  https://www.hollywoodreporter.com/news/general-news/walt-disney-company-bringing-frozen-2-disney-three-months-early-1284637/.

[57] Sam Adams, Universal Reacts to Coronavirus by Releasing New Movies Straight to Streaming, Slate (Mar. 16, 2020), https://slate.com/culture/2020/03/coronavirus-universal-movies-trolls-2-the-hunt-invisible-man-streaming.html.

[58] Rebecca Rubin, ‘No Time to Die’ Release Delayed to 2021, Variety (Oct. 2, 2020), https://variety.com/2020/film/box-office/james-bond-no-time-to-die-release-date-delay-2021-1234790944/.

[59]See id.; Alex Ritman, ‘No Time to Die’ Release Pushed Back Again in Australia, Hollywood Reporter (Aug. 20, 2021), https://www.hollywoodreporter.com/movies/movie-news/no-time-to-die-bond-25-delayed-australia-covid-delta-1235000521/.

[60] Frank Pallota, ‘No Time to Die’ Wasn’t a Box Office Blow Out. Here’s Why, CNN (Oct. 11, 2021), https://www.cnn.com/2021/10/10/media/no-time-to-die-james-bond-box-office/index.html.

[61] Dan Gallagher, ‘Black Widow’ Enters a Gray Area, Wall Street Journal (July 23, 2021), https://www.wsj.com/articles/black-widow-enters-a-gray-area-11627039800?mod=article_inline.

[62] Complaint at 9, Periwinkle Ent., Inc. v. Walt Disney Co., No. 21STCV27831 (L.A. Cnty. Super. Ct. July 29, 2021), https://deadline.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/Complaint_Black-Widow-1-WM.pdf.

[63] Joe Flint & Erich Schwartzel, Scarlett Johansson Sues Disney Over ‘Black Widow’ Streaming Release, Wall Street Journal (July 29, 2021), https://www.wsj.com/articles/scarlett-johansson-sues-disney-over-black-widow-streaming-release-11627579278.

[64] Id.

[65] Id.

[66] Gallagher, supra note 61.  

[67] Flint & Schwartzel, supra note 63.

[68] Gallagher, supra note 61.

[69] Flint & Schwartzel, supra note 63.

[70] Complaint, supra note 62, at 9.

[71] Id. at 14.

[72] Eriq Gardner, Scarlett Johansson’s ‘Black Widow’ Lawsuit Is Game-Changing, but May Be Legally Weak, Hollywood Reporter (July 30, 2021), https://www.hollywoodreporter.com/business/business-news/scarlett-johanssons-black-widow-lawsuit-1234990644/.

[73] Id.

[74] Complaint, supra note 62, at 14.

[75] Id.  

[76] Id. at 6.

[77] Id.

[78] Id. at 8.

[79] Id.

About the writer…

Liza is a 3L at USC Gould and she is delighted to contribute to Spotlight Entertainment Law Review as a writer. When growing up in Moscow, Russia, she frequently saw pirated DVDs of the latest Hollywood blockbusters in the display windows of dingy kiosks. Russia’s issues with pirated material is only the tip of the iceberg in a country where intellectual property is effectively abandoned. Liza now acknowledges that a disregard for the rule of law is the root of social, political, and economic stagnation. For this reason, Liza is excited to play a role in researching innovative applications of the law in the American Entertainment Industry and resolving intricacies found in this field!